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Comparative Legal Cultures?  
Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine Discipline 
 
 
Abstract. ‘Comparative law’ was born to challenge national self-centredness at the turn of 
the 19th to 20th centuries, without transcending–notwithstanding its admission of social and 
cultural-historical approaches in the study of law–the perspectives of rule-positivism. 
‘Comparative legal cultures’ attempts at explaining the prevailing cultural and traditional 
diversity that has generated, among others, western law with its modern formalism and the 
alternative ways of reaching social order in other cultures. By its focus upon the underlying 
culture and, thereby, also upon the hermeneutic understanding of legal phenomena, the latter is 
expected to offer growingly adequate responses to timely questions such as the universalisability 
of law and human rights, the convergence of the continental Civil Law and the British 
Common Law, or the development and future of the legal set-up in the Central and Eastern 
European region. 
 The interest of the comparative study of legal cultures is thus one in the history of 
ideas, dedicated to human problem-solving as the cultural response of people to external 
challenges. For the description of living complexes in terms of mere rules can result at most 
in ‘thin description’ with the exclusion of ‘thick description’, the more so as rules (just as 
concepts) are only the consequences of a kind of possible representation, therefore, relying 
exclusively upon them may contribute to dissolving even prevailing interrelations, atomising 
organic components as fragmented into detached elements. Or, institutional thinking not-
withstanding, not even the subject’s formalism can serve as a ground for restricting human 
completeness and integrity, cultural diversity, as well as responsibility to be taken for these. 
 
Keywords: comparative law & comparative legal cultures; law as text & reduction of law to 
rules; understanding of socialist law & transition to rule of law; rapprochment & convergence 
of Civil Law and Common Law 
 
 
1. Legal Comparativism Challenged 
 
Human thinking is not only uninterruptedly continuous, but even when viewed 
as a process, it cannot be described otherwise than as a kind of oscillation. In 
this oscillation, besides power concentrations alternating with each other and 
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adding up to wave crests and wave-troughs, any prevailing movement arises 
as a result of the ceaseless whirl of currents–and thereby drifts–coming from 
various directions. Routine and practical experience provide us some help from 
the past–forming a framework for our everyday action and, moreover, holding 
out promises of a perspective, a kind of illusory security–, however, in our 
presence at any given time, it is us who define fixed points for ourselves, in 
order to be able to arrange the entities at our disposal, as well as our concerns, 
into a kind of order at all. Therefore, when perceiving our ongoing occupations 
either as problem-solving or as acts of creative power, we have to be aware 
that, considered from a future perspective, all this may seem nothing other, or 
more ambitious, than just one of the episodes of stumbling from one blind 
alley into another. 
 What is, then, the proper way of cultivating scholarship at all? While looking 
for continuity from the past and for identity in the present, we are understandably 
conservative in designating our interest. When referring to our specific subject, 
we still speak of ‘legal theory’ in educational contexts, while we mention 
‘philosophy of law’ at our biannual world congresses as accustomed since the 
founding act of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy in Berlin in 1909; although the topics of subjects we teach and of 
scholarly papers we present do not recall, even in the way they pose a question 
or in their conceptual culture, the tradition acquired from previous generations 
in our youth. Namely, instead of “the system of legal sciences”, of “legal 
axiology” or the “theory of legal relations”, fashionable in the past decades, 
nowadays “semantics”, “hermeneutics” and “legal reasoning” or “logical analysis 
of law” are customarily dealt with. For the issues related to the “concept of 
law” or “legal ontology and epistemology” have all become, if you like, outdated, 
archaic and irrelevant as traditional fields: the question of philosophical founda-
tion has, for decades now, been replaced by the thrill of the social construction 
of reality1 that may lurk behind the scenes of manipulative applications we are 
  
 1 For the term, see Berger, P. L.–Luckmann, Th.: The Social Construction of Reality. 
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York, 1966. Questions not properly 
considered up to the present are why and how the philosophical perspective and the 
requirement for thorough foundation have disappeared from our legal thinking over the 
past few decades, and what they have been or are going to be replaced by, if at all. From 
the British analytical jurisprudence (e.g., H. L. A. Hart, J. Raz and N. MacCormick) to the 
American and Western European theories of reasoning (e.g., R. M. Dworkin on the one 
hand, and A. Aarnio, R. Alexy and A. Peczenik on the other), law is simply taken as given 
in an unquestioned culture, as are the social values and the culture of reasoning, held as 
specifically characteristic of a given community. By supposing their having been accepted 
from the very start, the task of legal theory now seems to be simply confined to raising 
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nowadays driven to incessantly search for. For what else could the way of 
scholarly interest be? All we can try is to respond to renewed challenges 
which–alongside new considerations, methodologically proven statements and 
conceptual distinctions–launch new waves and provoke currents, while the 
actors in the debates among the various positions emerging within these mostly 
turn back only very rarely and randomly to viewpoints, considerations and 
arguments dismissed as unworthy of further debate earlier in the discussion, 
and which viewpoints, consequently, had drifted away from the mainstream. 
 The same holds true of the comparison of laws which emerged as part of 
the comprehensive movement of comparativism by the advent of the “age of 
comparison”, as Nietzsche once rightly noted.2 When the inquiry into the 
various particularities of human construction, community language, national 
law (etc.) proved too limited to develop further towards the end of the 19th 
century in the cult of positivism, “comparative anatomy”, “comparative 
linguistics” and “comparative jurisprudence” emerged as a result. Of course, 
this could only imply a radical change away from the normal course of 
development, where also the self-closing retirement into the subject’s own 
particularity was most determinedly pushed to the extreme. Accordingly, it is 
not by chance that it was France, the native land of national chauvinism, to 
become the centre of comparative jurisprudence, and the European continent 
became preferred as its number one field of investigation. However, all the 
comparative movement in law has proved to be a non-recurrent task. In its 
turn, the very mention of such non-recurrence involves the recognition that, in 
the history of thinking, “isms” in general are inevitably bound to be assimilated 
step by step into and eventually absorbed by human thought in formation: as 
soon as the revolting breakthrough is made and reformatory thought is accepted, 
it ceases to survive as a separate entity. Just as present-day debates do not use 
terms of, e.g., Platonism or structuralism any longer, there is no specific need to 
explain why we resort to and call for–among others–comparison in our scholarly 
work. It is enough to note, maybe, that it is no longer usual for any monographic 
treatment of legal topics to be done without a genuine comparative-historical 
approach in the background. 
 Well, as far as the association of qualifying terms ‘comparative’ and 
‘historical’ is concerned, only our once characteristic narrow-mindedness and 
                                                      
awareness to, by explaining and developing also in details of interrelations, the human 
manipulative practice shaping the law in action. As a particularly telling panorama, see 
Luc, J.–Wintgens, L. J. (ed.): The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. My Philosophy of 
Law. Dordrecht–Boston–London, 1999.  
 2 Nietzsche, F.: Humain, trop humain [1878]. Paris, 1988. 49–50. 
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our self-closing into national boundaries in legal scholarship can explain why 
our Civil Law predecessors on the European continent had to emphasise, in 
their one-time breakthrough, the necessity of comparison (and not that of 
historicity) as being most in need of development. For historical jurisprudence, 
evolving around the middle of the 19th century within the Common Law as a 
follow-up of legal development generated by the practice of judicial decisions 
(having been cumulated one upon another as judicial precedents), was an 
entirely natural outcome;3 moreover, due to the shift of emphasis in the practical 
life of law to the search for judicial reason that arrives at declaring what the 
law is through a specific methodology of problem-solving, jurisprudence was 
not urged to transcend national borders, as it already achieved to carry out free 
search for similar sources in its quest for meaning, on the one hand. On the 
European continent and especially in France, on the other, the emphasis had 
for long been centred on the legislator as the representative and symbol of a 
national will and, therefore, any legal development could only be considered a 
national accomplishment. This is the reason why, with us, historical interest was 
gradually left out of the topicality of positive law, to form some complementary 
and additional subject as a separate discipline, both external to and irrelevant 
for everyday practice. 
 As noticed above, having achieved the breakthrough, legal comparativism 
has lost its specific function. For a moment, let us contemplate: if every analysis 
is already based on a historico-comparative approach, whoever would need a 
particular movement suitable just to force open doors? Continental positivism 
as the scholarly stand based upon the exclusive moment of statutory text-
enactment became to a certain extent antiquated by the first third of the 20th 
century anyway and, by the middle of the same century, the emphasis shifted 
firmly to the judicial process which was also to involve moments of social and 
cultural conditioning, thereby opening the gates to textual hermeneutics. Step 
by step, the text-positivism of the one-time legislatory definition of the law4 
and also the sociologism relating to the law’s social environment5 have eventually 
  
 3 Cf. Szabadfalvi, J. (ed.): Historical Jurisprudence. Budapest, 2000. 14–35 and 281–
285, respectively. 
 4 Cf., e.g., Varga, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991., 
especially ch. V. paras. 2/a and 4, introducing on the example of the classic type-framing 
Code civil (1804), how the definition of the law through legislatorial text in the juridical 
exegesis, characteristic of the early 19th century, has become gradually reduced to the role 
of providing a merely referential framework and disciplinary medium for the otherwise 
growingly free judicial declaration of what the law should be and/or is. 
 5 It is remarkable that anything in germ of a sociology of law had been heralded in 
parallel with the theoretical assertion of legal positivism, when two professors with same 
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been replaced by the open-chanced pondering of any (con)texture of the present, 
in which the questions “from where?” and “what?” are increasingly substituted 
by the ones of “how?” and “to what?”.6 
 Even in the field of law, the scene of our everyday life no longer seems to 
be just a case of determinations, but the starting point of creative and decisive 
switchings actually effected by each of us at any moment in those several roles 
we play, and thereby also the free medium for the manipulation of everything 
we have appropriated from our environment. As a consequence of all the 
above, the increase in awareness of the multiple and thorough repercussions of 
the humanities as a scholarly tradition upon the law and the requirement of 
social theoretical approach in legal thinking, the examination of law in parallel 
with other social regulative forces, as well as the adoption of an anthropo-
logical perspective (in the light of which law seems to be just one of the possible 
representations of the ideal of order required for any social formation), well, all 
these have led to a change in the search for specificity in law more powerfully 
in the context of culture as a whole (or, more precisely, in the context of the 
cultural response we offer in law to the various challenges, characteristic of the 
given human community and civilisation).7 
                                                      
backgrounds in Vienna, Hans Kelsen, formulating in theory the self-defining self-identifi-
cation of positive law, on the one hand, and Eugen Ehrlich, appointed to the new university 
of Czernowitz and theorising upon his new experience relating to the mess of co-existing 
folks and laws in Bukovina and Galicia in order to finally realise the empirical justifiability 
of some “living law” with no official support whatsoever in the background, on the other, 
contrasted sociologism and positivism in legal thinking. For the debate in Archiv für 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie from 1916 to 1917, see Stanley L. Paulson (hrsg.): 
Hans Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie. Aalen, 1993. 
 6 For the theoretical background, cf. Varga, Cs.: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Judi-
cial Process. In I[nternationales]R[echts]I[nformatisches]S[ymposium] 2006 Proceedings 
[Vienna, February 2006] {A bírói folyamat természetének kutatása. Jogtudományi Közlöny 
XLIX (1994) 11–12, 459–464} and, in monographic treatment, his Theory of the Judicial 
Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. as well as his The Context of the 
Judicial Application of Norms, in: Krawietz, W.–MacCormick, N.–von Wright, G. H. (ed.): 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, Festschrift for 
Robert S. Summers. Berlin, 1994. 495–512 [for paras. i–ii] and Law, Language and Logic: 
Expectations and Actual Limitations of Logic in Legal Reasoning, in: Ciampi, C.–F. Socci 
Natali–G. Taddei Elmi, I (ed.): Verso un sistema esperto giuridico integrale. Padova, 1995. 
665–679. 
 7 For a theoretical justification and background, cf. Varga, Cs.: A jog mint kultúra? 
[Law as culture?] Jogelméleti Szemle 2004/3 <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/varga11.html> as well 
as Macrosociological Theories of Law: From the »Lawyer’s World Concept« to a Social 
Science Conception of Law. In: Kamenka, E.–Summers, R. S.–Twining, W. (ed.): 
100 CSABA VARGA 
  
2. Comparative Legal Cultures versus Comparative Law 
 
As a consequence, the starting point is no longer either the law of a nation or 
its sectoral history, but the cultural medium in continuous formation, in which 
references, as the fixed and fixing points of human thinking and action–beliefs 
and values, preferences and aims, traditions and skills, methods and procedures–
may have developed in a given (and not another) way, that is, the medium in 
which a certain (and not another) notion of order and the associated (and not 
another) store of instruments (with a proper conceptual scheme and the role it 
may attribute to abstract logic) could evolve. If, in an inverse move, we start 
thinking from the endpoint, this explains why the comparative study of legal 
cultures neither supposes any kind of codified list, nor any set of questions, nor 
taxonomy, nor previously established methodology, regarding (or following) 
which the discipline of comparative legal cultures and its focus on the whole 
variety of cultures and ages should provide a response. Just to the contrary. 
According to its inherent approach, out of itself and through its in-built learning 
processes, each culture generates proper (general and sectoral) formations, 
frameworks and schemes, often ones and in manners characteristic exclusively 
of it–approaches and problem-sensitivities, organisational principles and notional 
distinctions, institutionalisations and procedural paths, methods and skills–, 
which are suitable, in their systemic totality, to define the specific character of 
an order which is going to be described by us a posteriori as a legal one, 
particular to the given culture. 
 By this point, we can claim to have indeed arrived, from the classical move-
ment known as ‘comparative law’, at the cultivation of ‘comparative legal 
cultures’. For our inquiry neither stays within the boundaries of law, nor does it 
start from an analysis of the available store of positive legal instruments, nor is 
it determined by the latter. For the most part, it concentrates neither on our 
ongoing present, nor wishes to contrast the formalised institutions–provided that 
they can be related at all–of certain nations to those of others. Instead, it attempts, 
with a cultural anthropological focus, to examine different possibilities (potentials 
and availabilities) as historically formed alternatives from a civilisational 
developmental perspective. The question here is exactly why a particular (and 
not another) legal idea and institutionalisation emerged in a given medium. And 
                                                      
Soziologische Jurisprudenz und realistische Theorien des Rechts. Berlin, 1986. 197–215. 
[Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 9] and Macrosociological Theories of Law: A Survey and 
Appraisal. Tidskrift för Rättssociologi III (1986) 3–4, 165–198. 
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the question it intends to answer is: why and how a certain (and not another) 
store of instruments has developed in the given place and time from all of this?8 
 ‘Comparative legal cultures’? How have we arrived at this very term? The 
linguistic expression itself is obviously a derived further development from the 
disciplinary term of ‘comparative law’ as widely accepted today. For this very 
reason, justified criticism for the former relates and applies to the latter as 
well. For it should be admitted that in their literal senses both the basic term 
and its derivation are, properly speaking, meaningless (and entirely alien to 
the very spirit of language), as contrasted to the properly compounded French 
terms droit comparé [‘compared law’=‘law that is compared, i.e., taken in 
comparison’] and cultures juridiques comparées. Despite this all, it is still 
capable of easy identification, and it is obvious for everyone that it is, by its 
very meaning, nothing other than a simplified and shortened version for the 
complex expression of the ‘comparative study of law [and, respectively, of 
legal cultures]’. 
 Apart from the rudimentary recognition of the obvious truth according to 
which “every national law should be explained as a proper part of human 
culture”,9 the movement of comparative law neither sought nor realised anything 
other than its own release from the national seclusion of domestic legal 
positivisms. Although the worldwide leading classic of legal comparativism 
from our recent past rightly claimed that 
 
“the comparison of laws is an important general cultural means for the 
lawyer, without which–and without the historical background serving as its 
completion and homologue–one cannot arrive at conclusions beyond the 
sphere of the given law and thus at a universality required of any genuine 
scholarship”,10 
 
the discipline has not subsequently become anything more than a sheer method–
however necessary it may be for any scholarly result to be reached–, selected 
  
 8 As a former research project proposal by the author, see his A jog és történelmi 
alternatívái [Law and its historical alternatives]. [1982] in: his Útkeresés Kísérletek – 
kéziratban [Searches for a path: unpublished essays]. Budapest, 2001. 127–131.  
 9 Kohler, J.: Über die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung. Zeitschrift für das Privat- und 
öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart XXVIII (1901), 273–284. 
 10 David, R.: Le droit comparé, enseignement de culture générale. Revue internationale 
de Droit comparé II (1950), 682–685. Cf. also Péteri, Z.: Some Aspects of the Sociological 
Approach in Comparative Law, in: Péteri, Z. (ed.):  Droit hongrois – droit comparé Études 
pour le VIIIe Congrès international de droit comparé. Budapest, 1970. 75–94. 
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out from the obviously desirable methodological complexity. In addition to the 
fact that bi- and multilateral comparisons of national laws have since (and largely 
due to this very movement) become accepted in scholarship, its fundamental 
and imperishable merits include having drawn up the actual11 and intellectually 
processed and historically developed12 global map of the world’s legal systems;13 
having taken the pioneering initiative of elaborating categories used for 
classifying (by drawing “family resemblances” for) the various legal orders and 
arrangements, together with having undertaken a largely static, descriptive 
presentation of the laws and orders on both a universal and especially a European 
  
 11 See, e.g., Randall, H. J.: Law and Geography. In: Kocourek. A.–Wigmore, J. H. (ed.): 
Evolution of Law Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions III. 
Formative Influences of Legal Development. Boston, 1918. ch. 6; Wigmore, J. H.: A Map 
of the World’s Law. The Geographical Review 19 (1929), 114–121 [starting from the 
statement that nine-tenth of the Earth’s population is governed by a dozen of laws, among 
which the Anglican, the Germanic, the Hindu, the Islamic, the Japanese, the Chinese, the 
Romanesque and the Slav ones continue exerting mass influence, while the Egyptian, the 
Greek, the Hebrew, the Canon, the Celtic, the Mesopotamian, the Roman and the maritime 
laws have in their original quality disappeared since];  Desserteaux, M.: Droit comparé et 
géographie humaine. Annales de Géographie LVI (1947), 81–93. [mostly identifying 
European legal ideas with their Christian roots “at present actually extant too” (83, note 2, 
as well as 85); and placing, in a remarkable way, the “mixed Roman method” between the 
“German” deductivism and the “English” inductivism, which, in case the statutory solution 
is deficient, applies, in addition to the deductivity of inferences from statutory dispositions, 
subsidiary empirical constructions inductively (in French, Spanish or Swiss law) or relies 
on French jurisprudence as a suppletive source (in Belgian or Rumanian law) (86); and 
foreseeing a joint intermediate method as the proper future solution for Europe (92)]; 
David, R.: La Géographie et le Droit. La Revue de Géographie humaine et d’ethnologie 2 
(1948), 78 et seq.; Sand, P. H.: Current Trends in African Legal Geography The 
Interfusion of Legal Systems. New York, [1971]. 27.; E. S. Easterly, III: Global Patterns of 
Legal Systems: Notes Toward a New Geojurisprudence. Geographical Review 67 (1977), 
209 et seq.; Guelke, L.: The Role of Laws in Human Geography. Progress in Human 
Geography 1 (1977), 376 et seq.; Economides, K.–Blacksell. M.–Watkins, Ch.: The Spatial 
Analysis of Legal Systems: Towards a Geography of Law? Journal of Law and Society 13 
(1986) 161–181. 
 12 See, e.g., Wigmore, J. H.: A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems I–III. St. Paul, 
Minn. 1928. 
 13 For a historical overview, cf. Varga Cs.: Theatrum legale mundi avagy a jogrend-
szerek osztályozása, in: Szilágyi, I. H.–Paksy, M. (ed.): Ius unum, lex multiplex Liber 
Amicorum: Studia Z. Péteri dedicata (Studies in Comparative Law, Theory of State and 
Legal Philosophy). Budapest, 2005. 219–242. and On the Classification of Legal Systems 
[Abstract], 243–244. 
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level.14 In this way, it has succeeded in raising the awareness of the relativity, 
the uniqueness, as well as the considerably accidental character of the various 
national legal orders, taken as the exclusive subject of jurisprudence since the 
classical age of the codification of national laws. 
 To the luck of us all, introduction to the main legal systems of the world 
under the heading of “comparative law” has become almost a sine qua non 
of legal education; as an independent scholarly trend, however, it soon became 
exhausted. Scholars and critics have for decades now been constantly complaining 
of its being “obstinately repetitive and sterile”,15 of its having a “precarious 
character”16 of a “mediocre quality”,17 resulting in “disappointing”18 “theoretical 
misery”,19 ending in “marginalisation”20 and “superficiality”,21 all in all, in 
methodological and theoretical “failure”,22 rightly “plagued by the absence of 
any sustained theoretical reflection on […] that comparative law is nothing 
more or less than a methodology”.23 As an expression of this depreciation through 
  
 14 E.g., Schlesinger, R. B.: Comparative Law Cases and Materials. Brooklyn–London, 
1950.; David, R.: Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé Introduction à l’étude des 
droits étrangers et à la méthode comparative. Paris, 1952.; Arminjon, P.–Nolde, B.–Wolff, 
M.: Traité de droit comparé I–III. Paris, 1950–1952.; Schnitzer, A.: Vergleichende Rechts-
lehre. Basel, 1945. [I–II, Zweite Aufl. (Basel, 1961)]; David, R.: Les grands systèmes de 
droit contemporains. Paris, 1964.; Duncan, J.–Derrett, M. (ed.): An Introduction to Legal 
Systems. London, 1968.; Zweigert, K.–Kötz, H.: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf 
dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, I [Grundlagen]–II [Institutionen]. Tübingen, 1971–1969.; 
Constantinesco, L. J.: Rechtsvergleichung I–III. Köln, 1971–1972.; David, R. et al. (ed.): 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Tübingen, 1973–1985.; Rheinstein, M.: 
Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. München, 1974.; Eörsi, Gy.: Comparative Civil 
(Private) Law Law Types, Law Groups, the Roads of Legal Development. Budapest, 
1979.; Rodière, R.: Introduction au droit comparé. Paris,  1979.; Schlesinger, R. B.–Baade, 
H.–Damaska, M. R.–Herzog, P. E.: Comparative Law Cases–Text–Materials. 5th ed. Mineola, 
N. Y., 1988.; Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Deventer–Cambridge, 1994.; Fromont, M.: 
Grands systèmes de droit étranger. 2e éd. Paris, 1994.  
 15 McDougal, M. S.: in The American Journal of Comparative Law I (1952), 29. 
 16 Hall, J.: Comparative Law and Social Theory. Baton Rouge, 1963. 6. 
 17 Rigauxm F.: in Revue du Droit international et de Droit comparé XXX (1978), 73. 
 18 Shapiro, M.: Courts. Chicago, 1981. vii. 
 19 Constantinesco, L.-J.: Traité de droit comparé. III. Paris, 1983. 21. 
 20 Frankenberg, G.: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law. Harvard 
International Legal Journal 26 (1985) 2. 
 21 Watson, A.: Legal Transplants. 2nd ed. Athens–Georgia, 1993. 10. 
 22 Legrand, P.: Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory. Modern Law 
Review 58 (1995), 262. 
 23 Samuel G.: Comparative Law. In: Gray, Ch. B. (ed.):  The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia. New York–London, 1999. 137. 
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external evaluation, it has recently been omitted from a collective represen-
tation of social sciences, not being listed as one of the many international 
comparativisms taken into account.24 In addition to rewriting the above 
mentioned map time and again and to promoting legal borrowing and the law’s 
adaptation,25 the most important of its tasks today is to serve the harmonisation 
and the prospective unification of laws and also the codification of a common 
European private law. In its turn, all this reinforces the discipline exactly in its 
standing decisive features, namely, at a focus on prevailing (valid and 
effective) regulations, its reliance upon positive law and handling the law as a 
given and ready-made instrument. 
 In contrast to the classical stance of comparative law, the comparative 
study of legal cultures has from the very start been interested in the genesis 
and formation of the law’s various phenomena and operations, that is, in how 
law evolved within various civilisations, producing various cultural responses 
in human efforts at problem solving, with varying moral and religious founda-
tions and value preferences in successive ages in a way rebuilding again and 
again. Or, this is also an interest in the history of ideas, manifesting itself in the 
general frame of the history of civilisations, dedicated to societal problem-solving 
capacity even when we are making formal and homogenised instruments and 
institutions, to arrive at a picture of the evolutionary progress sometimes taken 
as traditional history, characteristic of the given civilisation(s),26 or to arrive at a 
  
 24 The special issue of La Revue européenne des Sciences sociales (1986) mentioned 
only anthropological, economic, linguistic, psychiatric, religion-historical and sociological 
comparativisms as living. For the above criticism of comparative law, see especially 
Legrand, P.: Le droit comparé. Paris, 1999., passim, particularly at 8. 
 25 “Borrowing from abroad has become a recognised legislative practice in most 
contemporary states.” Sand: Current Trends in African Legal Geography. op. cit. 24. We 
have widely recognised since the elaboration of “cultural patterns” by Lévy-Strauss, C.: 
Les tristes tropiques. Paris, 1955.–that “the comparatively rapid growth of human culture 
as a whole has been due to the ability of all societies to borrow elements from other 
cultures and to incorporate them into their own.” Linton, R.: The Study of Man An 
Introduction. New York, 1936., 324. For a critical overview with a critical assessment, cf. 
Varga, Cs.: Transfers of Law: A Conceptual Analysis, in: Mamoru Sadakata (ed.): Hungary’s 
Legal Assistance Experiences in the Age of Globalization. Nagoya, 2006. 21–41. {with 
an abstract–Reception of Legal Patterns in a Globalising Age–in: Jiménez, J. J.–Gil, J.–
Peña, A. (ed.): Law and Justice in a Global Society. Addenda: Special Workshops and 
Working Groups (IVR 22nd World Congress, Granada, Spain, 24–29 May 2005). Granada, 
2005. 96–97.}. 
 26 E.g. Fikentscher, W.–Franke, H.–Köhler, O. (ed.): Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher 
Traditionen. Freiburg–München, 1980.; Jesús Lalinde Abadía: Las Cultures represivas de 
la humanidad (H. 1945) I [Adat y otras (pueblos infraevolucionades), Darma (Sudeste 
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cultural anthropological explanation of the legal choices we make,27 or to arrive 
at the construction of a comparative functional representation of the actual 
state that can be concluded from the practical appearance, utilisation and 
enforcement of the law through the sociological description of the medium by, 
and within, which law is conditioned and operated.28 
 Obviously, another ethos, another interest and another problem-sensitivity 
are at work here when they are related to the ones employed in the pioneer age 
of comparison. The path is evidently not already paved, and–instead of mere 
intellectual arguing–a new trail can only be broken if we set out on it. “Those 
who can, do it, those who cannot, explain it”–despite its one-sided injustice, 
this traditional wisdom tells a lot about the one-time Prussian pattern, so 
deeply ingrained in the socialist regime imposed upon us, thoroughly over-
ideologised. For we know: in huge parts of Moscow-dominated Eastern and 
Central Europe, cultivation of scholarship was virtually impossible, yet lengthy 
explanations introducing emptied textbooks proudly declared the abstract 
aspiration for a scholarly quality in the foursome of subject, method, structure, 
and purpose, which were set in stone. “Too much argumentation kills the deed”–
every thinker is expected to assume personal conviction and humility so that 
even if he is quite uncertain or formulates sheer presumptions, he shall cover 
the entire path of cognition. 
 An open question is, therefore, what the student of comparative legal 
cultures can achieve over the long run. Another question is the assessment of 
the reserves inherent in the bulk of fragmented studies comparing legal 
cultures, which have been published so far. A number of papers, coming from 
                                                      
asiático), Chíng (Extremo Oriente), Meecharu (Oriente Medio), Maat (Antiguo Egipto), 
Díke (Antigua Grecia), Ius (Roma-Biyancio), Torá (Judíos), Charía (Árabes)] – II 
[Directum (Europa latina e Iberoamérica), Reht (Europa germánica), Jog (Hungría), Prawo 
(Europa eslava), Common law (Mancomunidad anglo-sajona)]. Zaragoza, 1992.; and, most 
recently, Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions of the World Sustainable Diversity in Law. 
Oxford, 2000. For the last title, cf. also Varga Cs.: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families 
and Cultures of Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005), 177–197. 
 27 In addition to the first title in note 29, cf. also Feest, J.–Blankenburg, E. (ed.): 
Changing Legal Cultures. Oñati, 1997.; Nelken, D. (ed.): Comparing Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot, 1997.; Feest, J.–Nelken, D. (ed.): Adapting Legal Cultures. Oxford, 2001.; Bell, 
J. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. [Aldershot: Dartmouth (in preparation)]. 
 28 E.g., by Blankenburg, E.: Legal Cultures Compared, in: Ferrari, V. (ed.): Laws and 
Rights. Bologna, 1991. 93–101., Culture juridique comparative, in: Arnaud, A.-J. (ed.):  
Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit. 2e éd. Paris, 1993. 141–
142. and Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures, in: Comparing Legal 
Cultures. op. cit. 41–68. 
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the discipline of ‘comparative law’ strictly taken and, labelled as irrelevant, 
neither collected, nor studied by genuine comparativists, have, notwithstanding, 
investigated certain culturally relevant legal issues. 
 
 
3. Contrasting Fields 
 
Interestingly enough, the route I have tried to explore29 has received confirmation 
(thought-provoking themselves, and opening up new prospects as well) from 
most unexpected quarters in the recent past. In an attempt to describe the legal 
systems of Central and Eastern European countries now on the path of their 
transition to the rule of law,30 on the one hand, and in an effort to challenge the 
allegedly spontaneous convergence of the historical blocks of Civil Law and 
Common Law development, to be completed anyway through the European 
legal rapprochement,31 on the other, it has been noted that the “dogmatically 
entrenched and thoughtlessly transmitted preconceptions” of classical compara-
tive law (which “often operate as false generalisations and universalisations of 
what are, in fact, little more than localised, western-liberal perspectives”32), 
owing to their “epistemological barrier”,33 actually close down and block the 
way to cognition, instead of opening up and paving–by substantiating–it. For 
reducing law to mere rules not only transmits an image which falsely 
represents legal experience34 but, by its search for rationality, foreseeability, 
certainty, coherence, and clarity at any price, it also “strikes a profoundly anti-
humanist note”.35 By reducing the complexity of the law’s actual operation to 
  
 29 Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot–Hong Kong–Singapore–
Sydney–Dartmouth–New York, 1992., as well as Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures: 
Attempts at Conceptualization. Acta Juridica Hungarica 38 (1997), 53–63. 
 30 Puchalska-Tych, B.–Salter, M.: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe: The 
Need for a Dialectical Analysis. Legal Studies 16 (1996) 2, 157–184. 
 31 Legrand, P.: European Legal Systems Are not Converging. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1996), 53–81. 
 32 Puchalska-Tych–Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe… op. cit. 159. 
 33 Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging. op. cit. 60. For the concept 
of “obstacle épistémologique”, see Bachelard, G.: La formation de l’esprit scientifique 
Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective, 14e éd. Paris, 1989. 
 34 Cf. Salter, M.: The Idea of Legal World. International Journal of the Legal Profession 
1 (1994), 291–295. 
 35 Puchalska-Tych–Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe… op. cit. 179, 
as well as Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging. op. cit. 60. 
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the static and abstract formalism of one given official state doctrine,36 classical 
comparative law can at the most reproduce such complexity only in a superficial 
and simplifying way.37 
 
a) The Historical Understanding of Socialist Law 
As far as socialist law is concerned, ‘comparative law’ had–as the above 
mentioned British comparatists claim–generated a quite artificial concept upon 
the basis of an ideal type that had never actually existed anywhere. For it 
reduced various national legal systems with differing historical backgrounds 
and developmental abilities to one common denominator38 upon the basis of 
Muscovite-type imperialism alone (while formulating, in a sanctimonious way, 
an implicit theoretical justification for the then convenient Western politics 
of submissiveness). Ironically–shall we add–the collapse of communism was 
necessary for Western complacency eventually to realise that Westerners had 
seen something of themselves in socialism, while they easily ignored the 
features that had made communism so inhumane, destructive, unbearable and 
fatal as it was. For instance, never having been able to overcome its own domestic 
everyday routine in due time, the West used to consider outward appearances 
(of mere verbal declarations in the law of posited texts) as actually effective 
and legally enforced normative contents of socialist law.39 Therefore, it did not 
  
 36 Since its classical European definition–in Weber, M.: Rechtssoziologie (1960) and 
Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre (1934)–, the very concept of legal formalism has acquired a 
function of constituting criterion also in American theoretical literature. Cf., e.g., Weinrib, 
A.: Legal Formalism. The Yale Law Journal 96 (1988), 949 et seq.; Shauer, F.: Formalism. 
The Yale Law Journal 97 (1989), 509 et seq.; McBarnet, D.–Whelan, C.: The Elusive Spirit 
of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control. Modern Law Review 54 (1991), 
848 et seq.; Summers, R.–Atiyah, P.: Form and Substance in Anglo–American Law. New 
Haven–London, 1987. 
 37 Puchalska-Tych–Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe… op. cit. 183. 
 38 Ibid., para. 2, 164–174. 
 39 For the stubborn dominance of such a non-realisation and non-awareness having 
done, with its blindness, serious harms to the peoples in the Central and Eastern European 
region until the change of regimes controlled by the West was effected, see, by Varga Cs.: 
Transition to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary. Budapest, 1995. 
as well as Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának dilemmái [Man elevating 
himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age], in: Mezey, K. (ed.): Sodródó emberiség 
[Humankind adrift]. Budapest, [2000], 61–93; with a theoretical explanation, Rule of Law – 
At the Crossroads of Challenges. Iustum, Aequum, Salutare [Budapest] I (2005) 1–2, 73–88; 
and for western papers with the same realisation (as translated into Hungarian), also Varga, 
Cs. (ed.): Kiáltás gyakorlatiasságért a jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the 
transition to rule of law]. Budapest, 1998.  
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believe the conceptual attempts either which criticised socialism upon the 
recognition of its nature as a culture built on sheer lying, i.e., on dictatorial 
deception and lip-service. Referring to such experience, among other scholars 
in the region, I repeatedly tried to call the attention of international 
professional fora to the facts that, firstly, in contrast to the worldview of the 
traditionally self-closing legal positivism, the genuine nature of law can only 
be identified outside itself; secondly, the formalism of modern law is only a 
part of the ideology of the legal profession of the West from the 18th to 20th 
centuries; consequently, thirdly, extending the scope of formalism as a 
criterion from the internal sphere of professional deontology to the overall 
ontology of the legal phenomenon will necessarily conceal the distinctive 
features of those arrangements that are based on other principles (e.g., on 
divine revelation in Islamic and Jewish law) or which refer to formalism (e.g., 
in socialisms) mostly out of mere political-ideological motives.40 Or, as the 
same British comparatists propose (with reference to my own attempt),41 the 
solution is “the multitextuality of the legal cultures” as opposed to the “de-
contextualised picture” of ‘comparative law’, that is, to rely on “an entire 
contextual matrix in which the state law operates” (and, in it, also on the “micro-
social level of grass-root lived-experience”) within the “widely acknowledged 
[…] field of legal scholarship” of ‘comparative legal cultures’; bearing the 
lesson in mind that 
 
  
 40 See, by the author, as a clearly theoretical argument, Is Law a System of Enactments? 
in: Peczenik, A.–Lindahl, L.–van Roermund, B. (ed.): Theory of Legal Science. Dordrecht–
Boston–Lancaster, 1984. 175–182.; for questions raised in socialism, Law as a Social 
Issue, in: Wronkowska, S.–Zielinski, M. (ed.): Szkice z teorii prawa i szczególowych 
nauk prawnych Professorowi Zygmuntowi Ziembinskiemu [Outlines for legal theory: a 
festschrift for Prof. Zygmunt Ziembinski]. Poznan, 1990. 239–255.; and as the pathology 
of Socialism and, therefore, also as a claim for laying the foundations for a specifically 
issue-sensitive legal ontology, Liberty, Equality, and the Conceptual Minimum of Legal 
Mediation, in: MacCormick, N.–Bankowski. Z. (ed.): Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution 
Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy. Aberdeen, 1989. ch. 11, 229–251. {reprinted in 
Varga, Cs. (ed.): Marxian Legal Theory. Aldershot–Hong Kong–Singapore–Sydney–
Dartmouth–New York, 1993. 501–523.}. As to the modern law’s formalism, seen as a proper 
professional deontology, that is, as the very form of the law’s ontological existence 
(instead of the merely epistemological perspective of assessing it ideologically, or sheerly 
ideology-critically as a false consciousness, only motivated by the juristic world-concept 
[“juristische Weltanschauung”]), see, also Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács’ World 
Concept. Budapest, 1985 [reprint 1998]. 193, passim. 
 41 Comparative Legal Cultures. op. cit. xvii. 
 COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES? 109 
  
“a living body of law is not a collection of doctrines, rules, terms and phrases. 
It is not a dictionary, but a culture; and it has to be approached as such.”42 
 
b) Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law 
As to the convergence of European legal systems, a French-Canadian professor 
teaching at the Sorbonne in Paris gave voice to his doubts,43 which later stirred 
up an aggressive yet all the poorer international debate,44 in response to two 
  
 42 Puchalska-Tych–Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe… op. cit. 183; 
181, note 114; 182 and note 118, as well as 182, referring to Cotterrell, R.: The Concept of 
Legal Cultures, in: Comparing Legal Cultures. op. cit. 13–32. and Nelken, D.: Who can you 
Trust? The Future of Comparative Criminology [a lecture presented at the workshop 
entitled Comparing Legal Cultures. op. cit. {Macerata, May 18–20, 1994}], to Comparative 
Legal Cultures. xv–xxiv as well as Zedner, L.: In Pursuit of the Vernacular: Comparing 
Law and Order Discourse in England and Germany. Social & Legal Studies 4 (1995), 517–
535. Cf. also Friedman, L.: Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture, in: Clark, D. S. 
(ed.): Comparative and Private International Law. Essays in Honour of John Henry 
Merryman on his 70th Birthday. Berlin, 1990. 
 43 Cf., by Legrand, P.: Europen Legal Systems... op. cit., passim, as well as his Sens et 
non-sens d’un Code Civil Européen. Revue internationale de Droit comparé 48 (1996), 
779 et seq., Against a European Civil Code. Modern Law Review 60 (1997), 44. et seq., 
and Le primat de la culture, in: P. de Varaeilles-Sommières (ed.): Le droit privé européen. 
Paris, 1998. 1–5. It is to be mentioned that Markesinis, B. S.–Why a Code is not the Best 
Way to Advance the Cause of European Legal Unity. European Review of Private Law 
(1997), 519–524–, acknowledging the unfeasibility of a common code yet wishing to 
substantiate the convergence, introduced the German law of contracts in English in a series 
of collective works, adapting the method of 19th-century German pandectism–“first 
deconstruct and then reconstruct”–to English conditions. This laudable initiative was, 
however, qualified by its critic–Legrand, P.: Are Civilians Educable? Legal Studies 18 
(1998), 216 et seq., particularly at 227, note 63–as the “trivialisation” of German law. 
Markesinis, in return, gave way to a rejoinder of a personal tone in his Studying Judicial 
Decisions in the Common Law and the Civil Law: A Good Way of Discovering Some of 
the Most Interesting Similarities and Differences that Exist between these Legal Families, 
in: van Hoecke, M.–Ost, F. (ed.): The Harmonisation of European Private Law. Oxford–
Portland–Oregon, 2000. 117–134, especially 133. 
 44 Cf., just for one example, van Hoecke, M.: The Harmonisation of Private Law in 
Europe: Some Misunderstandings, in: The Harmonisation... op. cit. 1–20 [relying 
rather idealistically solely on measures of education and socialisation] and, especially,  
Chamboredon, A.: The Debate on a European Civil Code: For an »Open Texture«, in: ibid., 
63–99 [giving a post-modern expression to ancient wisdoms gained from the European 
experience of codification by combining legislatorial moderation, as well as from raising 
awareness of the use of flexible concepts and systematic interpretation]. All this was 
accompanied by such overtones in the overall debate that G. Samuel–English Private 
Law in the Context of the Codes, in: ibid., 47–felt prompted to state: “Weak theorising, 
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resolutions taken by the European Parliament on the commencement of the 
preparation, respectively actual drafting, of a Common European Code of Private 
Law,45 about which enthusiastic reports were at once released, concluding 
from the signs of “converging” and “a continual rapprochement” that “a new 
ius commune is thus in the making”.46 
 What are, then, these daring allegations? The description of living complexes 
in terms of mere rules results in “thin description” at the most, excluding 
“thick description” the more so as the rules are–just as the concepts–only the 
outcome of some feasible mental representation.47 Thus, any exclusive reliance 
upon or over-emphasis of them may only contribute to the dissolution of existing 
interrelations by atomising and fragmenting their organic components.48 Since 
in case of any law “you have to know where it comes from and what its image 
of itself is”,49 we can only conclude that there is a difference between Civil 
Law and Common Law, which is both irreducible and irresolvable at the same 
                                                      
simplistic metaphors and the arrogant dismissal of opponents’ arguments do Europe no 
favours.” 
 45 ‘European Parliament’s Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of 
the Member States’ Official Journal C158/400 (26 May 1989) and ‘European Parliament’s 
Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member 
States’ Official Journal C205/518 (6 May 1994). 
 46 de Groot, G.-R.: European Education in the 21st Century, in: De Witte, B.–Forder, C. 
(ed.): The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education. Deventer, 1992, 11; 
Glenn, H. P.: La civilisation de la common law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé 45 
(1993), 567; as well as Markesinis, B. S.: Bridging Legal Cultures. Israel Law Review 27 
(1993), 382. 
 47 Ryle, G.: The Thinking of Thoughts: What is »Le Penseur« Doing?, in: his Collected 
Papers II: Collected Essays, 1929–1968. London, 1971. 480, as well as Stengers. I.: Le 
pouvoir des concepts, in: Stengers, I.–Schlenger, J.: Les concepts scientifiques Invention et 
pouvoir. Paris, 1991. 63–64. It is to be remarked that the “praesumptio similitudinis”, 
proposed by Zweigert, K.–Kötz, H. in their An Introduction to Comparative Law. 2nd rev. 
ed. Oxford–New York, 1992. 36, according to which even radical differences in conceptuali-
sation may result in similar functional solutions in practice–as once expressedly observed 
by Zweigert, K. in his Solutions identiques par des voies différentes (Quelques observations 
en matières de droit comparé), Revue internationale de Droit comparé XVIII (1966), 5–18–, 
does not offer a refuge, because it indicates exactly the unsuitability and the barriers of 
text-formalism. 
 48 “We have put into people’s heads that society is a creature of abstract thought when 
it is constituted by habits and customs. When you submit habits and customs to the 
grindstone of reason, you pulverize ways of life based on longstanding traditions and 
reduce human beings to the state of anonymous and interchangeable atoms.” Lévy-Strauss, 
C.–Eribon, D.: De près et de loin. Paris, 1988. 165. 
 49 Merryman, J.: in The American Journal of Comparative Law 35 (1987), 441. 
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time. For it is made up of the difference between mentalities and worldviews 
with their implied presuppositions and attitudes, aspirations and empathies, 
which all constitute the deep structure and local rationality of thinking in terms 
of all the above and serve as the indispensable key to their cognition. This is 
why the classic of studies in Roman law once spoke (as if of the Hegelian 
Volksgeist) something of a secret intellectuality,50 recalling the original idea of 
Montesquieu: “It is not the body of laws that I am looking for, but their soul!”.51 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
With this, we have returned to the self-closure of ‘comparative law’. Although 
the programmatic methodological requirement according to which “the 
comparativist must eradicate the preconceptions of his native legal system”52 is 
well known, actually it is the Western concepts of order, ethos and rationality 
that are usually asserted as universal claims under the veil of “a non-
transparent and taken-for-granted Western ideology of value-free scientific 
approach to research”.53 This is what manifests itself in the global sanctioning 
of the Western ideal of law54 and especially in the service of current Atlantic 
and European endeavours which deliberately restrict the chances for survival 
of other ideals of order and legal arrangements,55 and also in the competition 
  
 50 Pringsheim, F.: Inner Relationship between English and Roman Law. Cambridge 
Law Journal (1933–1935), 348. 
 51 Montesquieu: Dossier de l’Esprit des Lois. In: Caillois, R. (ed.): Oeuvres complètes  
II. Paris, 1951. 1025. Legrand: European Legal Systems Are not Converging. op. cit. 55 et 
seq. explains in more detail the impossibility of convergence by the example of the radical 
differences both in legal reasoning and systematisation, and the use of rules and the role of 
facts, as well as the in meaning of entitlements and the varying presence of the past. 
 52 Zweigert–Kötz: An Introduction to Comparative Law. op. cit. 32. 
 53 Puchalska-Tych–Salter: Comparing Legal Cultures of Eastern Europe… op. cit. 160. 
 54 For a stand taken by legal philosophy, see, e.g., Surya Prakash Sinha: Non-universality 
of Law. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 81 (1995). 185–214. According to his 
radical conclusion, “law itself is parochial to Western civilisation”, therefore “transforming 
non-legal cultures into legal societies”, as forced by the majority of international 
organisations, is both harmful (as it evacuates cultural patterns) and subversive for the 
larger part of the world (209 and 211). 
 55 One of the fields of such fights today is the question of the universalisability, 
without a cultural loss, of human rights, taken as an ideal and as a store of instruments 
enacted by Atlantic documents in accordance with the Western legal ideal. See, e.g., Pollis, 
A.–Schwab, P. (ed.): Human Rights Cultures and Ideological Perspectives. New York, 
1979.; Surya Prakash Sinha: Human Rights: A Non-western Viewpoint. Archiv für Rechts- 
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for patterning the future European law through the re-writing of its past history56–
in short, which manifests itself in all preferences called ethnocentrism in 
                                                      
und Sozialphilosophie 67 (1981), 76 et seq.; Hassan, R.: On Human Rights and the 
Qur’anic Experience, and Mitra, K.: Human Rights in Hinduism. Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies 19 (1982), 51–65, resp. 77–84; Hjärpe, J.: The Contemporary Debate in the Muslim 
World on the Definition of »Human Rights«. In: Ferdinand,  K.–Mozaffari, M. (ed.): Islam 
State and Society. London, 1988. 26–38.; Welsh, C. Jr.–Leary, V. (ed.): Asian Perspectives 
on Human Rights. Boulder, 1990.; Preis, A.-B. S.: Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An 
Anthropological Critique. Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996), 286–315.; Dembour, M.-B.: 
Human Rights Talk and Anthropological Ambivalence: The Particular Contexts of 
Universal Claims. In: Harris, O. (ed.): Inside and Outside the Law Anthropological Studies 
of Authority and Ambiguity. New York–London, 1996. ch. 2, 19–40; Luf, G.: Peace and 
Human Rights as Seen by the Churches. In: Bsteh, A. (ed.): Peace for Humanity Principles, 
Problems and Perspectives of the Future as Seen by Muslims and Christians. New Delhi, 
1996. 143–157 and, for the debate, 158–177.; Lindholt, L.: Questioning the Universality of 
Human Rights The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Botswana, Malawi 
and Mozambique. Aldershot–Burlington USA–Singapore–Sydney, 1997.; Marfording, A.: 
Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of Japan. Human 
Rights Quarterly 19 (1997) 3, 431–448.; Perry, M. J.: Are Human Rights Universal? The 
Relativist Challenge and Related Matters. Human Rights Quarterly 19 (August 1997), 461–
509.; Boaventura de Sousa Santos: Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights. 
Sociologia del Diritto XXIV (1997), 27–45.; Hjärpe, J.: Some Problems in the Meeting 
between European and Islamic Legal Tradition Examples from the Human Rights 
Discussion [multipl.]. [Lund:] [n.y.] 21. The set of questions naturally involves interference 
through exerting political or economic pressure or via so-called humanitarian aid. For 
Central and Eastern Europe, see the titles in note 39 and, for an example distant but 
touching upon so called “Westernisation strategies”, Wai Man Sin–Chu Yiu Wai: Whose 
Rule of Law? Rethinking (Post-)Colonial Legal Culture in Hong Kong. Social & Legal 
Studies 7 (1998). 147–169. 
 56 After remarkable historical foundation–above all, by Koschaker, P.: Europa und das 
römische Recht. München, 1947. and Wieacker, F.: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung. Göttingen–Vandenhoeck–
Ruprecht, 1952.–and serials–first of all, Coing, H. (hrsg.): Handbuch der Quellen und 
Literatur der neueren Europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte München, 1973–1988. and Ius 
commune I–(1973–)–, accompanied by theoretical overviews–e.g., Wieacker, J.: Founda-
tions of European Legal Culture. The American Journal of Comparative Law 38 (1990), 1–
29., Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991., as well as Gessner, 
V.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs.: European Legal Cultures. Aldershot–Brookfield USA–
Singapore–Sydney, 1996., a discipline called ‘European legal history’ was born. For its 
outlines, see, e.g., Schulze, R. (hrsg.): Europäische Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte 
Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung. Berlin, 1991. and Schulze, R.: European Legal 
History: A New Field of Research in Germany. The Journal of Legal History 13 (1992). 
270–295. According to critics–e.g., Osler, D. J.: The Myth of European Legal History. 
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scholarship, cultural imperialism in politics, and neo-colonialism in practice. 
In fact, in the absence of any theoretically elaborated or methodologically 
founded opposing force, all such impacts have recently been marshalled mostly 
under the banner of ‘comparative law’ or at least with its active support. 
 Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that no kind of formalism can serve 
as an excuse for any restrictions on human entirety and cultural diversity, as 
well as on the professional responsibility to be taken for these.57 Accordingly, 
in our approach to legal institutions we also have to recognise individual and 
collective accomplishments in all human attempts at creating order, and 
provided they have produced values, we have to appreciate and try to preserve 
these as such.58 
 
                                                      
Rechtshistorisches Journal 16, 393–410–, all this endeavour dedicated to erecting a 
‘European legal history’ has only been conceived as to re-write history according to 
present-day interests, so as to conclude, by justifying the alleged past existence of a ius 
commune by the one-time allegedly dominant intellectual performance of today’s major 
European powers, to the advent of a ius commune in the European Union with a hegemonic 
role to be played in its framing by a German–Dutch–French bloc. For the pitfalls (with 
underlying methodological biases) of such a new Euro-historicism, see, among others, 
Anton Schuurman, A.: Globalisering en geschiedenis. Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis 
27 (2001), 385–410.; Borgolte, M.: Vor dem Ende der Nationalgeschichten? Chancen und 
Hindernisse für eine Geschichte Europas im Mittelalter. Historische Zeitschrift (2001), 
561–596.; and Hoenicke Moore, M E.: Euro-Medievalism: Modern Europe and the Medieval 
Past. Collegium (Summer 2002), 67–79. 
 57 Cf. Zacher, H. F. (ed.): Democracy Some Acute Questions [The Proceedings of the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 22–25 April 1998] 
Vatican City, 1999. and Zacher, H. F. (ed.): Democracy Reality and Responsability [The 
Proceedigns of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 
23–26 February 2000], Vatican City, 2001.  
 58 For a number of further related questions, cf. Krawietz, W.–Varga, Cs. (ed.): On 
Different Legal Cultures, Pre-Modern and Modern States, and the Transition to the Rule of 
Law in Western and Eastern Europe. Berlin, [2003]. Rechtstheorie 33 (2002) 2–4. 
